First They Came for the Poor: Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an Uncontested Practice by Maréchal, Nathalie
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 56-67 56 
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439) 
2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 56-67 
Doi: 10.17645/mac.v3i3.268 
 
Article 
First They Came for the Poor: Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an 
Uncontested Practice 
Nathalie Maréchal 
School of Communication, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90007, USA; E-Mail: marechal@usc.edu 
Submitted: 8 April 2015 | In Revised Form: 15 July 2015 | Accepted: 4 August 2015 |  
Published: 20 October 2015 
Abstract 
There have been moments in American history when government surveillance of everyday citizens has aroused public 
concerns, most recently Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations concerning widespread, warrantless surveillance of Amer-
icans and foreigners alike. What does not arouse public concern are longstanding governmental practices that involve 
surveillance of poor people who receive certain types of public benefits. This article traces the political history of U.S. 
poverty-relief programs, considers the perspective of welfare beneficiaries themselves, analyzes American cultural be-
liefs about the poor in order to offer some thoughts on why those surveillance practices garner little public concern, 
and argues that those who are concerned about warrantless surveillance of ordinary citizens should do more to protect 
ordinary poor citizens from surveillance. 
Keywords 
beneficiaries; poor; poverty; public benefits; surveillance; welfare 
Issue 
This article is part of the special issue "Surveillance: Critical Analysis and Current Challenges", edited by James Schwoch 
(Northwestern University, USA), John Laprise (Independent Researcher) and Ivory Mills (Northwestern University, USA). 
© 2015 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 
 
1. Introduction 
There have been moments in American history when 
government surveillance of everyday citizens has 
aroused media attention. These moments include Ed-
ward Snowden’s revelation of NSA practices in 2013, 
the 1972 media revelations of FBI widespread surveil-
lance of United States citizens, and perhaps even the 
Joseph McCarthy hearings in 1954. What does not 
arouse public concern are longstanding governmental 
practices that involve surveillance of poor people who 
receive certain types of public benefits. This article out-
lines some of those surveillance practices, offers some 
thoughts on why those surveillance practices garner lit-
tle public concern, and argues that those who are con-
cerned about warrantless surveillance of ordinary citi-
zens should do more to protect ordinary poor citizens 
from surveillance. 
Since Edward Snowden’s first revelations in July 
2013, Americans—and the world—have learned that 
millions of individuals are under surveillance by the 
U.S. national security apparatus. The controversy sur-
rounding these practices is typically framed in terms of 
trade-offs between civil rights and liberties (including 
privacy) on the one hand, and national security con-
cerns on the other. These national security concerns 
almost invariably invoke the specter of the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks. However, the trend toward increased sur-
veillance predates 9/11. Notably, federal national secu-
rity and law enforcement agencies systematically 
infiltrated and spied on African American communities, 
civil rights activists and anti-war groups throughout the 
1950s, 1960s and early 1970s under the COINTELPRO 
program (Glick, 1989). The specific targets of state sur-
veillance vary, but the logic stays the same: surveil, 
control and isolate the sources of perceived risk in or-
der to prevent contagion to the rest of society (Beck, 
1992). Since 9/11, Arab and Muslim communities have 
been the prime targets of domestic surveillance 
(Greenwald & Hussain, 2014), and several recent books 
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have examined the Internet economy’s reliance on 
commodification of myriad data points concerning citi-
zen-consumers, gradually habituating us all to perva-
sive surveillance (Angwin, 2014; Scheer, 2015). 
One group of individuals who have been consistent-
ly surveilled for decades is generally left out of this con-
versation: the poor. Indeed, low-income Americans must 
submit to invasive monitoring of their private lives in or-
der to receive the benefits to which they are legally enti-
tled. This has been the case for decades, with the 
breadth and depth of surveillance expanding along with 
the affordances of available technologies. In contrast, 
very little documentation is required to receive benefits 
in the form of tax rebates, which generally benefit the 
rich and amount to much higher sums. Moreover, this 
mass invasion of privacy receives broad support from 
the American public, including from many recipients 
themselves, who often have only vague ideas of what 
the computerized welfare system knows about them or 
how this information is acquired (Gustafson, 2011). 
Thus, one of the features of 21st century American 
welfare is widespread surveillance that is poorly under-
stood by its subjects—and, I will argue, whose subjects 
are largely invisible to mainstream American society. In 
this paper I use John Gilliom’s definition of surveil-
lance: “the increasingly routine use of personal data 
and systematic information in the administration of in-
stitutions, agencies, and businesses” (Gilliom, 2001, p. 
2). As we have learned since 2013, mass surveillance 
has become a hallmark of 21st century American life. 
Writing in The New Prospect, SUNY professor Virginia 
Eubanks warns that “the revelations that are so scan-
dalous to the middle class—data profiling, PRISM, 
tapped cell phones—are old news to millions of low-
income Americans, immigrants, and communities of 
color.” She recounts an interview with a young mother 
on welfare, who told her that while receiving her food 
stamps though Electronic Bank Transfer (EBT) was con-
venient, her case worker used the system to review her 
grocery purchases item by item. “Poor women are the 
test subjects for surveillance technology,” the young 
woman told Eubanks, “and you should pay attention to 
what happens to us. You’re next.” This conversation 
occurred a decade ago (Eubanks, 2014, para 2). 
This article analyzes the cultural norms and beliefs 
embodied by the American welfare system, considers 
these norms and beliefs’ involvement in other aspects 
of the surveillance society, critiques the current regime 
of welfare data collection, and calls for an administra-
tion of the social safety net that is both more humane 
and more effective. After providing an overview of the 
history of the American social safety net as it stands, 
emphasizing Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Clinton 
welfare reform, I will turn to the perspectives of wel-
fare recipients themselves and of the general American 
public, before finally suggesting some directions for fu-
ture research and policy action. 
2. The American Welfare State 
The phrase “welfare state“ refers to a normative view 
of government that holds the public sector ultimately 
responsible for the physical, social and economic well-
being of the citizenry. While European countries began 
providing state-run and tax-funded social safety nets 
and labor protections starting in the late 19th century, 
in the U.S. the prevailing view of the elites was that as-
sistance to the needy would only encourage idleness 
and other undesirable behavior, and that social Dar-
winism would ensure that only the individuals with the 
best work ethic and moral character would prosper 
and reproduce. Franklin Delanoe Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
in the wake of the Great Depression, represented a 
departure from the past through programs such as the 
Works Progress Administration, later renamed the 
Works Projects Administration (WPA), which created 
employment through great works projects; Social Secu-
rity, a retirement program for old age and the disabled; 
and many other poverty-relief programs collectively re-
ferred to as “welfare” (O’Connor, 2003). 
In addition to Social Security, intended to care for 
those relatively few (compared to today) individuals 
who made it to old age, New Deal welfare programs 
were designed to replace the earnings of an absent, 
deceased or otherwise incapacitated father figure, 
thereby allowing mothers to continue in their roles as 
home-makers and primary care-givers for their chil-
dren. It is important to note that women of color were 
largely excluded from receiving benefits through both 
structural and individual-level racism on the part of 
program administrators (Mink, 1996; Neubeck & Ca-
zenave, 2001; O’Connor, 2003; Quadagno, 1994). 
Decades later, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, 
which included both the War on Poverty and civil rights 
legislation, went a long way toward easing the struc-
tural barriers preventing poor blacks from receiving aid 
as well as institutionalizing the welfare system. How-
ever, as black Americans fought to access welfare pro-
grams (Piven & Cloward, 1979), public perception of 
the average welfare recipient shifted from the virtuous 
white widow heroically raising her children alone to 
the lazy, promiscuous, deviant (and wholly imaginary) 
black “welfare queen” mythologized by Ronald Reagan 
(Gilliom, 2001; Gustafson, 2011; O’Connor, 2003).  
The welfare assistance program was further ex-
panded in the 1960s as part of Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society initiative, intended to eradicate poverty and 
correct structural racial injustice. The War on Poverty 
was thus intertwined with government efforts to enact 
the demands of the civil rights movement. A compre-
hensive policy analysis of the War on Poverty would fall 
outside the scope of the present paper; however a few 
key facts merit foregrounding. The 1965 Social Security 
Act raised benefits, increased eligibility, created Medi-
care (federally-funded medical insurance for Americans 
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over age 65) and Medicaid (medical insurance for low-
income Americans, jointly funded by the federal and 
state governments), while the 1964 Food Stamp Act 
made the program permanent (it had consisted of pilot 
programs until then). Other legislation created the 
school lunch program, through which poor children re-
ceive meals through their schools, and even provided 
contraception for poor adults through state health de-
partments. By the end of the Johnson Administration, 
the U.S. appeared to be on its way to easing, if not 
eradicating, poverty (O’Connor, 2003). 
Even as surveillance, work requirements and fraud 
prevention programs continued to grow, the 1970s, 
1980s and early 1990s saw two broad social changes 
that would prove crucial to the welfare system: chang-
es to the family structure and demographic composi-
tion of welfare rolls, and technological advances in in-
formation management (Gilliom, 2001; O’Connor, 
2003). Divorce and single parenthood became more 
prevalent, some of the structural barriers preventing 
poor people of color from accessing aid were disman-
tled, and the availability of birth control made single 
motherhood seem more and more like a choice, and 
less like an unavoidable tragedy. As a result, the Ameri-
can public (and legislators) became less willing to pro-
vide support to the poor, and especially to poor, black, 
single mothers who were increasingly stigmatized as 
lazy, promiscuous and undeserving. The “welfare 
queen” rhetoric espoused by Reagan and others also 
contributed to increased prejudice and stigmatization 
of poor Americans (Hancock, 2004; Gilens, 1999; Gus-
tafson, 2011; O’Connor, 2003). Writing in 1982, M. 
Donna Price Cofer warned that “the current mania in 
this country to dismantle thirty years of social pro-
grams will adversely affect not only public assistance 
recipients but also the agencies that administer these 
benefits” (Cofer, 1982).  
At the same time, networked databases made it 
possible to classify and surveil large populations, and to 
do so across administrative boundaries of city, county 
and state human services offices. To be sure, no wel-
fare state could function without some degree of ad-
ministrative surveillance. Frank Webster (2014) sum-
marizes the intertwined nature of publicly 
administered benefits and some degree of surveillance 
succinctly, reminding us of Anthony Giddens’ (1987) 
assertion that “the administrative power generated by 
the nation-state could not exist without the infor-
mation base that is the means of its reflexive self-
regulation” (p. 180), and of Paddy Hillyard and Janie 
Percy-Smith’s (1988) conclusion that “the delivery of 
welfare benefits and services is at the heart of the sys-
tem of mass surveillance, because it is here that the 
processes of classification, information gathering and 
recording are constantly multiplying” (p. 172) (cited in 
Webster, 2014, p. 298-299). 
The combination of increased motivation to reduce 
welfare spending and increased technical ability to mon-
itor welfare recipients could only lead to increased sur-
veillance, and Cofer’s fears would be realized as part of a 
deal between Bill Clinton and the Gingrich Republicans 
in the run-up to the 1996 election (O’Connor, 2003). 
The 1996 welfare reform bill, formally (and telling-
ly) titled the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), was the culmina-
tion of two decades of “conservative ideological and 
political victories” (O’Connor, 2003, p. 223). As such, it 
was more concerned with sending a message to the 
poor about personal morality than about designing ev-
idence-based interventions to provide Americans with 
a basic minimum standard of living, much less durably 
lifting families out of poverty. As O’Connor notes, “the 
preamble to the PRWORA openly describes it as being 
principally concerned with overcoming the problems 
caused by out-of-wedlock births and welfare depend-
ency. Further, the act claims that its purpose is to 
strengthen marriage, personal responsibility, and the 
work ethic” (O’Connor, 2003, p. 224). Actually reducing 
poverty is nowhere on the agenda. 
The Clinton welfare reform was based on the prem-
ise that nearly all parents should work outside the 
home to support their children, even if the wages they 
could command in the labor market were less than the 
cost of childcare. By the 1990s, women’s participation 
in the workforce was already well-entrenched, and the 
idea that welfare ought to provide an income to poor, 
husbandless mothers, so that they might stay at home 
raising their children, was at odds with the new norm 
of dual-income families. For many, the difficulties of 
raising children alone while working outside the home 
were simply the natural consequence of the “irrespon-
sible choice” to have children without a husband’s 
practical and financial support. As we will see, restrict-
ing poor women’s options with respect to their sexual 
and reproductive lives—arguably the most personal, 
private realms of human existence—is a feature, not a 
bug, of the American welfare system. 
The welfare-to-work program featured a number of 
“sticks and carrots” intended to incentivize work and 
discourage fraud (or so the claim went), but in practice, 
the rules were (and continue to be) poorly understood, 
haphazardly applied, and, it seems, arbitrarily enforced 
(Gustafson, 2011; Hasenfeld, 2000; Schram, 2000). 
Moreover, benefit levels are woefully inadequate1, and 
                                                          
1 Any good faith discussion of welfare fraud must begin by ac-
knowledging the inadequacy of benefits. To use California as 
an example, as of 2011, the minimum basic standard of ade-
quate care, as determined by the federal government, for a 
family of three was $1,135 per month. The Maximum Income 
for Initial Eligibility for a Family of Three was $1,224, meaning 
that families earning more than that amount are ineligible for 
aid. Families needed to already be significantly below the pov-
erty line before they could even apply for aid. The asset limit 
was $2,000 ($3,000 for households including an elderly per-
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families must resort to alternative sources of income to 
make ends meet. The result is both endemic fraud and 
widespread underutilization of benefits to which indi-
viduals and families are legally entitled (Gustafson, 
2011). 
The 1996 Act set time limits on how long individuals 
could receive benefits, imposed work requirements, 
and drastically tightened eligibility rules. The federally-
run Assistance for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) was replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), which is implemented by the states. 
Under PRWORA the states are given clear incentives 
from the federal government to “get as many of their 
welfare population working as possible” (O’Connor, 
2003, p. 230). States are also free to impose even tighter 
eligibility rules and shorter time limits than those envi-
sioned by the PRWORA. The guiding principle of TANF 
is not meeting the basic needs of poor Americans, but 
“fraud prevention” (Gustafson, 2011, p. 96). 
The Act also empowered state governments to 
delve into the personal and sexual lives of women of all 
ages, by requiring single mothers to identify the biolog-
ical fathers of their offspring and by capping TANF 
payments to families, meaning that “recipients do not 
receive any further money if they have more children 
while on the TANF program” (O’Connor, 2003, p. 230). 
These “family size caps” are meant to dissuade women 
from having additional children while on welfare by 
barring newly born children from being included in 
benefit calculations. The implication is that the only 
“legitimate” children are those born to a married 
mother and father, and that, by definition, the child of 
a mother on welfare is not “legitimate.” During the 
PRWORA negotiations, “much of the debate cast ‘ille-
gitimacy’ as America’s most pressing social problem, 
and quickly blamed ‘welfare’ as its root cause” 
(O’Connor, 2003, p.235). 
While the Act’s authors preferred co-parents to be 
married to each other, in the absence of marriage they 
were determined to more strictly enforce child support 
requirements. The implementation of a “national com-
puter tracking system” made it easier to “locate non-
resident parents across state boundaries” and garnish 
their wages (O’Connor, 2003, p. 232). Mothers who 
can’t or won’t identify their children’s biological father 
risk losing their TANF eligibility. Money recouped from 
so-called “dead-beat dads” goes not to the children or 
their mother, but to the state as a reimbursement for 
                                                                                           
son), plus one automobile per licensed driver—requiring fami-
lies to have sold off virtually all their assets. The Maximum 
Monthly Benefit for a Family of Three with No Income was 
$638 (non-exempt) or $714 (exempt)—slightly more than half 
of what the government considers necessary for survival. By 
contrast, the MIT Living Wage Calculator project estimates that 
such a family needs $54,764 per year, or $4,564 per month, to 
make ends meet in California (Glasmeier & Schulteis, 2015). 
the cost of support that the father should have been 
providing in the first place, with the exception of a $50 
pass-through (O’Connor, 2003). Mothers thus have 
every economic incentive to resist identifying their 
children’s father. 
States also “have the discretion to deny benefits to 
unmarried teenage mothers,” “can mandate teenage 
mothers attend school,” and “require unwed minors to 
live with a parent or guardian” to receive aid 
(O’Connor, 2003, p. 230)—regardless of whether that is 
in the best interest of the young mother or her child. 
Meanwhile, “the act required the federal government 
to spend $50 million per year on a new abstinence ed-
ucation program in American schools” (O’Connor, 
2003, p. 231) and provided “financial rewards to states 
that reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births as 
long as there is not a corresponding increase in the 
number of abortions performed in that state” —
though these “illegitimacy bonuses” were short-lived 
(O’Connor, 2003, p.231). For all the emphasis on pre-
venting child-bearing by unmarried poor women, 
PRWORA did nothing to promote use or affordability of 
methods of birth control other than sexual abstinence. 
The real problem that PRWORA sought to eradicate 
wasn’t child poverty or even fatherlessness, but sexual 
activity by poor women (and especially poor women of 
color) outside the bounds of holy matrimony. 
3. Welfare Surveillance: The Recipients’ Perspective 
According to John Gilliom (2001), “high levels of inves-
tigation into the lives of the poor have always been a 
central part of relief programs” in the United States, 
“generally designed with little attention to the dignity 
of the client” (pp. 13-14). This surveillance focuses on 
“whether or not a family will be eligible for assistance,” 
which is accomplished through a “means test” consist-
ing of “some mechanism for determining if someone is 
eligible by assessing their needs, their resources, or 
their capacity to work.” For Gilliom, “this one constant 
in American welfare surveillance, reflecting both our 
faith in the importance of labor and our suspicion that 
people will do nearly anything to avoid it, is the central 
point in the ongoing state examination of the poor” 
(Gilliom, pp. 19-20). 
Ethnographic work by Gilliom (2001), Gustafson 
(2011), Seccombe (2011), and others provides rich in-
sight into the ways that welfare recipients experience 
their interactions with the state’s surveillance system. 
Gilliom writes: 
Low-income American mothers live every day with 
the advanced surveillance capacity of the modern 
welfare state. In their pursuit of food, health care, 
and shelter for their families, they are watched, an-
alyzed, assessed, monitored, checked, and reevalu-
ated in an ongoing process involving supercomput-
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ers, caseworkers, fraud control agents, grocers, and 
neighbors. (Gilliom, 2001, p. xiii) 
Additionally, the burden of complying with eligibility 
verification requirements is often so time-consuming 
that it interferes with recipients’ ability to look for 
work or care for their families. In rural areas with scant 
public transportation options, a visit to deliver paper-
work to the welfare office can take an entire day. Elec-
tronic submission of required documents is either dis-
allowed by the welfare agency, or unavailable to 
recipients who lack the necessary hardware, Internet 
access, and computer skills. To add insult to injury, 
many offices require the same paperwork to be re-
submitted on a recurring basis, even though the docu-
mentation (Social Security cards, children’s birth certif-
icates) does not change over time. As Gustafson notes, 
The documentation of daily life is a form of state 
surveillance to which welfare recipients submit but 
also a form of surveillance which they resist, some-
times to their detriment. It was this routine docu-
mentation that the interviewees described as inva-
sive and oppressive (Gustafson, 2011, p. 97). 
Gilliom’s field work also revealed that “the mothers 
complained about the hassle and degradation caused 
by surveillance and the ways that it hindered their abil-
ity to meet the needs of their families” (Gilliom, 2001, 
p. 6). Time spent traveling to the welfare office is often 
perceived as time wasted, and means tests dissuade 
recipients from taking part-time work or work that 
would pay less than their welfare benefit—unless they 
can hide this income from the eligibility worker. Gilliom 
and Gustafson both describe the calculations that 
mothers in particular engage in before rationally con-
cluding that their duties to their children demand that 
they engage in welfare fraud, whether by working un-
der the table or claiming not to know the father’s iden-
tity or his whereabouts—even if he is in fact a part of 
the children’s lives. Thus, “as the state struggles to 
know as much as it can about the poor—and to use its 
knowledge with critical consequences for poor peo-
ple’s lives—an inevitable struggle over information and 
perception comes to define the unfolding politics of 
surveillance” (Gilliom, 2001, p. 20). 
As with other populations under similar surveil-
lance, welfare recipients feel the psychic weight of liv-
ing their lives under the watchful eye of the State. The 
following quotation exemplifies the psychological ef-
fect of pervasive surveillance: 
You have to watch every step like you are in prison. 
All the time you are on welfare, yeah, you are in 
prison. Someone is watching like a guard. Someone 
is watching over you and you are hoping every day 
that you won’t go up the creek, so to speak, and 
(that you will) get out alive in any way, shape or 
form. You know, “Did I remember to say that a child 
moved in?” “Did I remember to say that a child 
moved out?” And, “Did I call within that five days?” 
You know…making sure all the time….It’s as close to 
a prison that I can think of. (Mary, a forty-
something mother of three, on welfare, in Appala-
chian Ohio (cited in Gilliom, 2001, p. 1)) 
Paradoxically, Gustafon’s field work “revealed that 
while these welfare recipients found it impossible to 
comply with the rules and most considered it impossi-
ble for anyone to follow the rules, many of the inter-
viewees nonetheless believed that the work require-
ments, the time limits, the family caps, the extensive 
reporting rules, and the stiff penalties for breaking the 
rules were good, necessary, and legitimate” (Gus-
tafson, 2011, p. 170). The women interviewed by both 
Gilliom and Gustafson had internalized the widespread 
cultural prejudice against people living in poverty, of-
ten buying into tropes that had no basis in reality, such 
as the Welfare Queen invented by Ronald Reagan. In 
both studies, virtually all respondents shared the atti-
tude that while they themselves needed and deserved 
the social safety net, most other people on aid were 
abusing the system—a perception that is sadly preva-
lent. The next section delves into the cultural norms and 
beliefs held by mainstream American society about the 
poor in general, and welfare recipients in particular. 
4. Welfare Surveillance: The “Taxpayers’” Perspective 
The following quote, from the online comments on Vir-
ginia Eubanks’ article in The New Prospect, illustrates 
the widespread belief that welfare payments belong 
not to the recipient, but to the taxpayer: “As a taxpayer 
I applaud looking at EBT records to see if you are 
spending MY money on WHAT I approve of, as in MY 
money” (online comment to Eubanks, 2014). This line 
of argumentation suggests an opposition between tax-
payers and welfare recipients, between working Amer-
icans and poor Americans (even though these condi-
tions are hardly mutual exclusive), in a telling 
throwback to the 18th and early 19th centuries, when 
only landowners—who were, of course, exclusively 
white and male, and didn’t necessarily work them-
selves—could vote. Nearly 200 years later, arguments 
that full participation in society is tied to economic par-
ticipation through tax-paying remain, framing the right 
to vote as the province of the “productive,” and not as 
an inherent right conferred by citizenship. Dorothy E. 
Roberts characterized this divide as one between citi-
zens and subjects (Roberts, 1996). This conception, of 
course, obscures the fact that no one is a tax payer 
throughout the life cycle (childhood, old age), and 
there are very few people who never pay taxes. We 
can see this wealth-based model of citizenship at work 
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in present-day efforts to pass voter ID requirements, 
which overwhelmingly impact the poor, and to the 
drastically different rhetoric surrounding taking ad-
vantage of tax deductions, which disproportionately 
benefit the wealthy and upper-middle classes.  
This frame was prominent during Mitt Romney’s 
2012 presidential campaign, especially after Romney 
was recorded telling a room of wealthy campaign do-
nors that “47 per cent” of Americans were “moochers” 
who “paid no income tax” and didn’t take “personal re-
sponsibility…for their lives” (Beutler, 2014). Romney’s 
running mate Paul Ryan similarly contrasted “makers” 
to “takers,” and a number of political commentators 
have noted that this was a “foundational belief” of the 
Romney/Ryan campaign (Beutler, 2014, para 8). In con-
tract, Barack Obama, who was then running for reelec-
tion, was quick to retort: 
When you express an attitude that half the country 
considers itself victims, that somehow they want to 
be dependent on government…maybe you haven’t 
gotten around a lot…the American people are the 
hardest-working people there are. Their problem is 
not that they’re not working hard enough or that 
they don’t want to work, or they’re being taxed too 
little, or that they just want to loaf around and 
gather government checks. People want a hand up, 
not a handout” (quoted in Landler, 2012). 
The claim that entitlement spending was out of control 
and unaffordable for the federal budget reemerged in 
late 2013 as Congress debated whether to authorize an 
extension of unemployment benefits for the millions of 
Americans who lost their jobs during the Great Reces-
sion and whose unemployment insurance was about to 
expire. Yet even the strongest advocates of extending 
unemployment insurance, such as the office of Harry 
Reid, then the Senate Majority Leader, differentiated 
between the deserving unemployed who had fallen vic-
tims to the recession “through no fault of their own” 
and “need this lifeline to make ends meet while they 
continue to look for work” (Kaplan, n.d.), and the un-
deserving, unmentioned masses of the poor dependent 
on other forms of public assistance. 
While Democrats, liberals and progressives essen-
tially remain quiet about welfare recipients, Republi-
cans and other conservatives are quite vocal about 
their beliefs that poverty is primarily the individual’s 
fault, and that poverty relief hurts rather than helps 
the poor. For example, a Forbes article by Peter Ferrara 
claims that the War on Poverty caused poverty rates to 
rise after 1965, while simultaneously asserting that 
“one major reason that poverty stopped declining after 
the War on Poverty started is that the poor and lower 
income population stopped working” (Ferrara, 2013, 
para 7), and foregrounding the War on Poverty’s “asso-
ciation with the breakup of lower-income families and 
soaring out-of-wedlock births” (Ferrara, 2013, para 8). 
Yet despite its incendiary title (“‘Welfare State’ Doesn’t 
Adequately Describe How Much America’s Poor Con-
trol Your Wallet”) the article does nothing to connect 
spending on social welfare programs to the individuals 
wallets of Forbes’ imagined audience. A review of sev-
eral recent publications by the Heritage Foundation, a 
leading conservative think tank, reveals that for con-
servative thinkers, the success of a given welfare pro-
gram or policy should be measured by its stinginess, 
and not by whether it helps the poor maintain a basic 
standard of living. For example, The Daily Signal’s2 cov-
erage of a TANF program extension in Colorado notes, 
“the [program] documents conceded the change could 
increase money going to welfare recipients and keep 
them on the program longer” (Kane, 2014, para 4). In 
the context of an anemic economic recovery that is 
concentrated in the upper socioeconomic classes, it 
would seem that an increase in benefits would be pre-
cisely the point of such a policy change. Similarly, arti-
cles by Edwin J. Feulner and by Robert Rector (2014) 
decry the dollar figures of welfare spending without 
ever considering the lived experiences of the poor. 
Human beings living in poverty are completely absent 
from the conversation about welfare, except when 
they are villainized and shamed. 
Though it failed to pass, in late 2014 Congress con-
sidered an amendment to the Farm Bill requiring food 
surveillance in the Supplement Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). The legislation would have “mandat-
ed that retail food stores collect, and report to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, detailed information that identi-
fies food items purchased with benefits provided under 
the supplemental nutrition assistance program” (Rog-
ers, 2014). It is not at all clear what the amendment’s 
sponsors thought should be done with this infor-
mation, but the logic behind such a proposal is exactly 
what the commenter on Eubanks’ article spelled out: 
welfare benefits are funded with tax dollars, which 
come from individual (as well as corporate) taxpayers, 
ergo said taxpayers have a right to know and control 
what welfare recipients purchase. This is the same logic 
that Hobby Lobby and its supporters used in Burwell vs. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. to successfully argue that at 
least some corporations should be exempt from the Af-
fordable Care Act’s requirement that health insurance 
plans cover birth control at no additional cost (beyond 
the insurance premium itself). Financial contribution, 
no matter how indirect, is construed as a source of le-
gitimacy for controlling women’s bodies. Poor women, 
by definition, lack the financial resources to combat 
                                                          
2 A “national network of investigative reporters covering waste, 
fraud and abuse in government” affiliated with the Franklin 
Center for Government & Public Integrity. The Heritage Foun-
dation’s website prominently links to The Daily Signal, signaling 
the outfit’s ideological affiliation. 
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these claims, whereas wealthier women are exempt 
from this control, as they tend to have better health in-
surance coverage or can afford to pay out-of-pocket. 
Yet we seldom hear serious arguments from pacifists 
that they should be able to veto defense expenditures 
because they pay taxes, or from scientists who refuse 
to pay for public school systems that teach Creation-
ism, for example. There seems to be a cultural link be-
tween conservative thought and the belief that finan-
cially contributing to something, no matter how 
indirectly, creates a right to control distant outcomes. 
5. Analysis 
Welfare offices at every level of government spend ex-
orbitant sums cross-referencing databases, following up 
on tips from welfare fraud hotlines, drug-testing, physi-
cally surveilling, and legally prosecuting the poor, osten-
sibly to save the taxpayer money by cutting off welfare 
frauds and cheaters. In many jurisdictions, the amount 
spent on welfare enforcement dwarves the sums saved 
by removing “cheaters” from welfare rolls. For example, 
the state of Utah spent $30,000 over the course of a 
year to ferret out presumed drug use among welfare re-
cipients. The program found that only 2.6% tested posi-
tive for illegal drugs, which is well below the national use 
rate, 8.9% (Kelly, 2013). Programs in Arizona, Oklahoma 
and Florida similarly failed at their purported goal of sav-
ing taxpayer money. In fact, the Florida program cost the 
state $45,780 in testing expenditures (Alvarez, 2012). 
One might think that this money would be better 
spent on welfare itself, especially in the context of the 
Great Recession and anemic recovery. However, a 
large body of social science research suggests that the 
guiding logic of the U.S. welfare system is not the actu-
al wellbeing of poor families, but punishing the poor for 
being poor and setting them up as cautionary examples 
to discourage others from being poor as well (Bussiere, 
1997; Gustafson, 2011; Eubanks, 2012; Piven & Cloward, 
1993; Gilliom, 2001; O’Connor, 2003; Seccombe, 2011; 
Soss, 2002). As Salon’s Brian P. Kelly put it,  
Welfare-based drug testing is only a symptom of a 
larger societal ill that sees the poor as inherently 
parasitic and viceful (e.g., “They take advantage of 
government programs, not us.” “They do drugs, not 
us.”). As a result, legislators heap unfair, ineffective 
policies on those in poverty simply to court public fa-
vor by playing to their prejudices. The welfare queen, 
cashing government checks, smoking drugs and living 
the life of luxury, continues to be a useful myth when 
it comes to winning votes. And as more of these poli-
cies, whose support is borne by an unfounded dis-
dain for the poor, are enacted, the humanity of 
those living in poverty is further eroded as the chasm 
between the haves and the have-nots grows even 
wider. (Kelly, 2013) 
Indeed, for Gustafson, “the drug testing of welfare re-
cipients particularly highlights the conflation of poverty 
and crime and the widespread assumption that poor 
women of color are the causes of crime” (Gustafson, 
2011, p. 60). While it seems that awareness of the lim-
ited usefulness of drug testing is relatively widespread 
in policy circles, the systematic surveillance of welfare 
recipients is either ignored or uncontroversial. 
While mass drug testing seeks to control the risk 
that is presumably caused by poor women’s bodies, 
electronic surveillance situates the assumed risk in the 
practices of everyday life, not least of which include 
poor women’s sexual and reproductive lives. As more 
and more of daily life is captured by electronic data-
bases whose data can be matched and analyzed in in-
creasingly revealing ways, more facets of the human 
condition become susceptible to surveillance (Bauman 
& Lyon, 2013). Electronic surveillance of the poor is 
particularly insidious for three reasons. First, welfare 
recipients who lack formal education and computer 
skills often have trouble conceiving of the types of data 
and computational analysis that are possible. Second, 
they lack the political capital to fight the system, much 
less change it, particularly as many welfare recipients 
have so internalized the trope of the “Welfare Queen” 
that they profess to believe that the system and its 
rules are necessary and just, even as they themselves 
“cheat” the system in whatever ways necessary to sur-
vive and provide for their families (Gilliom, 2001; Gus-
tafson, 2011).  
And finally, in the United States the receipt of most 
kinds of public assistance is highly stigmatized (with the 
important exception of maximizing tax deductions, 
which is widely applauded), and there is widespread 
support for all kinds of government intrusion in the 
lives of the poor: unannounced home visits, mandatory 
drug testing, electronic and physical surveillance, and 
family benefit caps intended to discourage women who 
receive welfare from giving birth to additional children. 
For example, the third comment on the online version 
of Eubanks’ New Prospect article contains multiple as-
sertions that “As a taxpayer I applaud looking at EBT 
records to see if you are spending MY money on WHAT 
I approve of, as in MY money” (Eubanks, 2014, online 
comments). This quote is representative of widespread 
cultural beliefs, as I discussed in the previous section. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has tackled the systematic surveillance of 
Americans by foregrounding the well-entrenched prac-
tice of surveilling the poorest and most vulnerable 
members of society: welfare recipients. This practice is, 
outside of certain activist and academic circles, utterly 
uncontroversial and enjoys wide public support, even as 
other kinds of surveillance are coming under scrutiny. 
Writing in 2008, Henman and Marston noted that “the 
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social policy literature seems to have taken a limited in-
terest in recent developments in surveillance practices” 
(Henman & Marston, 2008, p. 188) and that “academic 
interest in the social division of welfare has waned in re-
cent years” (Henman & Marston, 2008, p. 191). 
While the academic and legal literature on this top-
ic is very rich and conservative think tanks are prolific 
on the perils of welfare spending, the issue appears to 
be all but ignored in progressive public policy circles, 
even as they focus attention and resources on the 
mass surveillance programs that Edward Snowden ex-
posed. I found only one reference to welfare surveil-
lance among recent think tank policy papers, a collec-
tion of essays on “Big Data and Discrimination” 
published by New America (Peña Gangadharan, 2014). 
The digital rights sector doesn’t perform much better: 
for example, the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) website has a page dedicated to “Poverty and 
Privacy,” but it doesn’t refer to any materials published 
since 2003. I have, however, been privy to confidential 
conversations and strategy meetings of civil society re-
searchers and activists about the surveillance to which 
communities of color, including welfare recipients, are 
subjected. It remains to be seen what will come of 
these projects. Professional advocacy organizations 
tend to pick battles that they think they can win, and 
so far there is no indication that fighting for the civil 
rights and human dignity of welfare recipients is a win-
ning political tactic. Updated research in the vein of 
Piven and Cloward’s excellent “Poor People’s Move-
ments” (1979) is needed if poor Americans are to re-
gain their dignity and humanity. Encouragingly, the 
aforementioned Virginia Eubanks is currently working 
on a book about welfare surveillance. 
The paucity of the policy-oriented literature may 
very well be due to the absence of data, as the decen-
tralized structure of welfare administration since 1996 
makes it all but impossible to come by nationally com-
parable datasets on the welfare population or benefit 
levels. Because welfare programs are administered by 
the states on a county-by-county basis, the federal 
government has little to no authority to oversee or crit-
ically assess the adequacy of benefit levels, bureaucrat-
ic processes, or the return on investment in terms of 
assuring a decent quality of life for the poorest among 
us. For example, the statistics maintained by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) measure 
expenditures and the number of beneficiaries; no ef-
fort is made to account for how well welfare programs 
meet recipients’ basic needs, or how well the programs 
are administered. In fact, states measure the success of 
their welfare programs by the number of needy Ameri-
cans they can remove from the welfare rolls, regardless 
of what happens to these families afterward. 
As discussed previously, welfare policy is plagued 
by the inaccurate beliefs that many Americans hold 
about public assistance beneficiaries. Speaking at a 
2015 symposium organized by the University of South-
ern California Law School, Kaaryn Gustafson went so 
far as to say that we have “no chance” of living in a so-
ciety where everyone (notably poor mothers) is treated 
with dignity and humanity until we dispense with the 
“Welfare Queen” trope. In turn, correcting these mis-
perceptions is hindered by the information and data 
flows concerning welfare and its beneficiaries. The offi-
cial statistics on welfare and poverty measure the 
wrong things in the wrong way, thereby creating non-
factual “knowledge” that hides genuine problems 
(hunger, poverty) while surfacing imaginary ones (ille-
gitimacy, drug abuse, fraud, etc.). 
Rather than measuring the prevalence of poverty 
and its human costs, federal statistics focus on the ad-
ministration of the programs. For example, the Tenth 
TANF Annual Report to Congress noted that in 2011 
(the most recent year for which this report is available), 
the Federal poverty threshold for a family of four (two 
adults plus two children) was $22,811, that 21.9% of 
children were living in poverty that year (16.1 million), 
and that the child poverty rate in 2011 was 5.7 per-
centage points higher than in 2000. However, the re-
port does not mention whether TANF (or other welfare 
programs) was successful in reducing the number of 
American children (much less adults) living in poverty, 
or the percentage of need that is met. Even the re-
port’s authors seem to be aware of the limitations of 
their data, noting: 
Participation of Eligible Families  
While many see TANF’s caseload decline as a meas-
ure of the success of welfare reform, the sharp de-
cline in participation among eligible families also 
raises concerns about its effectiveness as a safety 
net program. HHS uses an Urban Institute model to 
estimate the percentage of families eligible for as-
sistance under state rules that are actually receiving 
TANF assistance.  
As shown in Figure 2-E, and Appendix Table 2:3, this 
participation rate data shows that the share of eli-
gible families receiving TANF declined from 84 per-
cent in 1995 to 32 percent in 2009. (Tenth TANF 
Report to Congress, 2013, p. 21) 
From these figures, it should be possible to compare 
benefits awarded against the need they are intended 
to ameliorate, yet this is not done. The closest that the 
report comes is Figure 9B, “Income Poverty Gap for All 
Families with Children 1997−2011” (p. 54). The poverty 
gap refers to the amount of money that would be re-
quired to raise all poor families to the poverty line. 
However, the figures are only provided with respect to 
families with children—demonstrating a lack of con-
cern for adults living in poverty—and are not broken 
down by state or by any other category. The figures 
convey the fact that in 2011, it would have cost $76.5 
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billion to raise all American children out of poverty, but 
stops short of providing any information that would 
help achieve this. 
The report also highlights the low rates of participa-
tion of TANF-eligible families, yet it does not provide 
any additional information on possible reasons why 
less than a third of families that are eligible for TANF 
are not receiving benefits, stating: 
In FY 1994, the assistance caseload reached a high 
of an average monthly 5.05 million families; six 
years later, the assistance caseload declined to an 
average monthly 2.36 million families in FY 2000. 
This decline has been attributed to a host of events, 
including economic growth (and the concomitant 
drop in poverty), welfare reform implementation, 
and other policies designed to promote work 
among low-income families with children (such as 
expansions in the Earned Income Tax Credit and 
child care subsidies). Throughout this period, there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of single 
mothers leaving TANF for work. (Tenth TANF Report 
to Congress, 2013, p. 15). 
The last sentence clearly refers to the myth of Welfare 
Queen—still very much a concern for bureaucrats and 
elected officials alike. The reference to “welfare reform 
implementation” is a blatant tautology: welfare reform 
tightened eligibility requirements, and as a result fewer 
people were eligible for benefits—hardly the same 
thing as eliminating or even reducing poverty. 
The example of federal statistics concerning TANF 
illustrate the broader reality that assessments of wel-
fare programs emphasize inputs such as expenditures, 
ignoring program outputs and other measures of hu-
man wellbeing. From a public administration perspec-
tive this makes sense: the Department of Health and 
Human Services is legally mandated to collect and re-
port these statistics. The question remains why it does 
not also provide measures of human wellbeing. 
Moreover, the fact that a practice is legally man-
dated provides an explanation for why it exists, but 
does not constitute a moral or ethical reason. As with 
many other situations (legal protections for whistle-
blowers come to mind), the United States and post-
modern societies more broadly lack a mechanism for 
reconciling the gap between what is legal and what is 
ethically or morally just. 
The information that is most crucially lacking in the 
current data flows concerning welfare fall under three 
categories: the extent of need, how much of that need 
is met by the social safety net, and cost/benefit anal-
yses of fraud prevention. The fact that so many mem-
bers of the wealthiest society in human history are 
needy is reprehensible, and welfare programs ought to 
be evaluated by their success in meeting that need. 
Granular datasets and tables that examine these two 
types of measures by state, county, and various demo-
graphic dimensions would shed light on outcome dis-
parities between different groups, thus allowing for 
targeted remedies. Finally, the effectiveness of fraud-
prevention schemes should be methodically assessed. 
Schemes that cost more than the amount saved should 
be eliminated, and the funding reinvested into benefit 
payments. For example, in 2009 the California State 
Auditor found that “the measurable savings resulting 
from early fraud detection activities exceed the costs 
of such efforts for CalWORKs and approach cost neu-
trality for the food stamp program” (Howle, 2009). By 
this logic, then, early fraud detection was a valuable in-
vestment for CalWORKS, but not for food stamps. 
More state and local level auditors and Inspectors 
General should pursue this kind of analysis and pres-
sure the agencies that administer welfare programs to 
do the same. 
It is vitally important that researchers in academia, 
in government, and in civil society do the work of gen-
erating accurate, nationally comparable empirical evi-
dence to inform policy and debate. Indeed, the lack of 
data is a key barrier to both research and advocacy. 
Even as the system relentlessly seeks out every scrap of 
information about the poor to verify their deserving-
ness, it deliberately fails to provide systemic data that 
would help administer programs more effectively. This 
is a stunning paradox: a system whose guiding principle 
is the collection of information yields virtually no data 
that could meaningfully inform public policy.  
To the lay person the argument that welfare surveil-
lance robs the poor of their dignity and humanity may 
seem like wild hyperbole. But as Gilliom reminds us,  
Surveillance programs are ways of seeing and 
knowing the world. They assert values, identify pri-
orities, define possibilities, and police the depar-
tures. In so doing, they build important structures 
of meaning that help to shape our world and our 
place within it (Gilliom, 2001, p. xiii). 
Welfare surveillance is also a feminist issue. As I have 
discussed, surveillance of welfare recipients is over-
whelmingly concerned with the sexual and reproduc-
tive lives of poor women, as reflected by practices such 
as bed checks, family size caps, and home visits de-
signed to catch women living with an unrelated male. 
Additionally, poor women—and increasingly, working 
class women—are denied access to birth control, then 
shamed and punished for becoming pregnant. As abor-
tion care becomes increasingly restricted, the message 
sent to poor women is a simple choice: marriage or ab-
stinence. Meanwhile, poor men are largely excluded 
from receiving aid since most welfare programs are de-
signed to support children (and by association their 
caregivers, albeit begrudgingly). The main mechanism 
through which poor men are expected to interact with 
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the welfare system is through child support collections. 
Popular opposition to welfare is deeply rooted in 
the historical legacy of racism (Gordon, 1994; 
Quadagno, 1994). Indeed, opposition to the social safe-
ty net is connected to the (inaccurate) belief that wel-
fare recipients are overwhelmingly black (Gilens, 1999). 
Surveillance of any kind is “not a mere glance ex-
changed between equals—it is both an expression and 
instrument of power” (Gilliom, 2001, p. 3). By exercis-
ing their right to surveil and control the daily lives of 
poor Americans via the state, self-proclaimed “taxpay-
ers” assert their position of privilege over the poor and 
mark them as Other. 
Nor is welfare distinct from the plight of low-wage 
workers in a neoliberal society. Under the transatlantic 
leadership of Reagan and Thatcher, the 1980s saw “an 
assault on organized labor, initially the trade unions, 
but extending to collectivist ideas tout court” (Webster, 
2014, p. 85)—including the notion of a social safety 
net. This trend has only accelerated over the past 30 
years. As companies increasingly automate low-skilled 
work and outsource jobs to cheaper labor markets, the 
share of the U.S. workforce that is contingent (i.e. cy-
cling between employment and unemployment) has 
been growing steadily, reaching up to 25% of the labor 
market (Webster, 2014, p. 89). The most vulnerable 
among these are discursively excluded from society, 
and are instead constructed as an underclass “thought 
to inhabit the inner city ghettoes and isolated parts of 
the regions, but significantly it is considered a tiny 
group detached from the vast majority of society, sepa-
rate and self-perpetuating, which, if an irritant to law-
abiding, is apart from the bulk of the populace, which is 
mortgage-owning, self- and career-centered” (Web-
ster, 2014, p. 89). As a result, the poor, left “without a 
stake in post-industrial society…are to be pitied, feared 
and condemned (Dalrymple, 2005; Mount, 2010)” 
(Webster, 2014, p. 90). 
While it is true that the poor’s standard of living is 
higher today than it was in the industrial era, the poor 
have been increasingly marginalized relative to the 
middle and upper classes. Webster (2014) notes that 
“while in the past the working class was subordinate to 
the owners of capital, it was widely accepted that it 
was still indispensable” (Webster, 2014, p. 123). Today, 
with much of American manufacturing and blue-collar 
jobs having been outsourced to countries with lower 
labor costs (and often lesser or non-existent regulatory 
protections for labor), it is much easier for the middle 
and upper classes to dismiss the poor as a distant 
“Other” whose struggles are theoretically troubling, 
but practically irrelevant. This is why I propose to 
change the data inputs into the cybernetic machine of 
the welfare state (Wiener, 1988). Only when the state, 
and the bureaucrats who comprise it, start measuring 
success by human impact factors rather than economic 
measures of thrift will meaningful policy change be 
possible. Civil society should lead the way by producing 
these datasets to the extent possible, perhaps by fo-
cusing on a specific state or local jurisdiction, then con-
fronting relevant public sector actors about the relative 
inadequacy of their own data. The California State Au-
ditor’s report is an encouraging example of what can 
be accomplished.  
In this paper I have alluded to the surveillance soci-
ety’s shifting gaze as one group after another has be-
come targeted for surveillance. The function of surveil-
lance is to monitor and isolate the risk that each group 
is deemed to present to society: welfare recipients, Af-
rican Americans, civil rights activists, Arab and Muslim 
Americans, journalists, individual police officers, and 
more. In addition to direct state surveillance, 21st cen-
tury Americans are also subject to commercial and so-
cial surveillance through social networking sites, which 
often provide the mechanism for state surveillance 
(Angwin, 2014; Scheer, 2015). Much like the proverbial 
frog who is boiled to death because he fails to realize 
that the water is getting warmer, we as a society—
Americans in particular, but not exclusively—are in dan-
ger of waking up in a Panopticon of our own creation. 
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